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An Uncivil Partnership: Egypt’s Jama’a Islamiyya and the State after the Jihad 
 
Ewan Stein 
 
Abstract 
This paper will examine the JI as an example of a group that has, in different ways, tried to shape 
patterns of civility and position itself as an interface between state and society in Egypt.  It charts and 
offers an explanation for the JI’s intellectual and programmatic transition from aspiring to create a 
totally new polity based on a salafi Islamic form of civility, to an accommodation with the state and 
apparently more tolerant posture vis-à-vis society. The paper analyses the JI’s shifting interpretation 
of hisba and argues that although the JI appears more reconciled to a more cooperative stance, the 
group continues to promote an unrealistic vision of state-society relations in Egypt.  Whereas before 
the revisions the JI proceeded from an idealised conception of the Islamic state and the potential for 
its realisation in Egypt, the JI’s new ideas suggest an equally naive conception of the existing state and 
its ability to regulate, and police, society.  The political and intellectual trajectory of the JI tells us 
much about the role of societal groups in sustaining authoritarianism in Egypt and suggests that any 
compact between the JI and a regime like that of Mubarak is likely to remain ‘uncivil.’ 
 
 
The ideological ‘revisions’ of the Egyptian Islamic Group, the Jama’a Islamiyya (JI), 
have been lauded as a major success story of deradicalisation in the post-9/11 era.1  
Less attention has been paid, however, to the significance of the changes for the JI as 
a domestic actor in Egypt, or on their relationship to the Egyptian political context.  
This paper will examine the JI as an example of a group that has, in different ways, 
tried to shape patterns of civility and position itself as an interface between state 
and society in Egypt.  It charts and offers an explanation for the JI’s intellectual and 
programmatic transition from aspiring to create a totally new polity based on a salafi 
Islamic form of civility, to an accommodation with the state and apparently more 
tolerant posture vis-à-vis society.   
Prior to the revisions process, the JI’s ideological attitude to the regime was in line 
with that propounded by Sayyid Qutb in the 1960s.  It was, because it ruled 
according to man-made laws, outside of Islam: it was part of the sphere of ignorance 
(jahiliyya, adj. jahili) or unbelief (kufr) and would have to be forcefully overthrown in 
order for the Islamic movement to realise its goals.  Following the permanent 
ceasefire unilaterally declared in 1997, and then the ideological revisions process 
that began in 2002, the JI deemed the state to be authentically Muslim even if not 
everything it did could be attributed directly to the Qur’an or the example of the 
Prophet (Sunna).  The new JI strongly affirmed the regime’s authority and legitimate 
monopoly of violence.  In return for this recognition, the group expected the state to 
allow the ‘Islamic movement’ (al-haraka al-islamiyya) to carry out its distinctive 
purpose in society, namely education, moral guidance and proselytising (da’wa). 
 
The ceasefire and revisions process most prominently signalled the end of the JI’s 
jihad against the Egyptian regime.  But on an ideological or theoretical level, the shift 
was also reflected in the reinterpretation of hisba, or al-amr bi-al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy 
‘an al-munkir (Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil), which was arguably a far larger 
part of the group’s programmatic armoury.  The most important element in the 
change concerned the individuals authorised to discharge this function (the 
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muhtasibun).  During the period of confrontation with the regime, in light of the fact 
that all state agencies, including al-Azhar, were seen to be tainted by their belonging 
to the jahili state structure, the JI deemed the state unfit for this purpose and called 
for Muslims, particularly those at the vanguard of the Islamic movement, to assume 
the role of muhtasibun themselves.  Following the revisions, the JI spelt out the 
precise nature of the muhtasibun more clearly and limited the extent to which 
private individuals could use force or the threat of force to maintain or create moral 
order.  Its focus shifted from moral issues per se, such as drinking or selling alcohol, 
unveiling, or playing music, to crimes like theft, assault or drug use.  Apparently 
lawless thugs (baltajiyya) frequently topped the list of societal ills.  Under the new 
ideology, although the ordinary citizen—JI member or otherwise—could intervene to 
prevent a crime (jarima) from taking place, ultimate responsibility for policing 
behaviour rested with the state and the ‘appointed muhtasib,’ and the regulation of 
moral behaviour depended not only on Islamic law (shari’a), but also on the 
established mores and customs of society, which were acknowledged to vary from 
place to place. 
 
This paper argues that although the JI’s intellectual orientation has shifted 
dramatically, the direction of this shift from idealism to realism is more apparent 
than real.  Whereas before the revisions the JI proceeded from an idealised 
conception of the Islamic state and the potential for its realisation in Egypt, the JI’s 
new ideas suggest an equally naive and unrealistic conception of the existing state 
and its ability to regulate, and police, society.  In seeking to form the backbone of a 
new Islamic civil society, not just promoting good behaviour but also helping the 
state to police it, the JI has overlooked the ‘incivility’ of the postcolonial Egyptian 
state.  If we define civility in Weberian terms as embodying codes of behaviour and 
interaction judged acceptable by citizens, then the ability of the state—as the 
monopoliser of the legitimate use of violence—to safeguard and promote civility in 
accordance with the law depends on whether the state and its organs themselves 
are perceived to be not only legitimate, but also civil.2  As many scholars, and almost 
all Egyptians, have long recognised, the agents of the Egyptian regime—and the 
police in particular—have been associated more with corruption, criminality, and 
capricious coercion than with principles of civic virtue.3 
 
The paper will first briefly discuss the emergence of the JI as a challenge to state 
authority.  Next it will review the pre-revisions ideology of the JI as it pertained to its 
notion of civility, including the roles of state and societal actors in ordering and 
transforming a common social and political public space in Egypt.  Next, the paper 
suggests some of the main reasons why this vision of the civilising process in Egypt 
failed, before examining the group’s new positions on these topics as well as on its 
own aspirational role as a link between the Islamic movement and the state.  The 
paper concludes with some reflections on what the JI case reveals about the nature 
of Egyptian politics in general. 
 
The Jama’a Islamiyya’s Jihad 
Although best known for its role in the assassination of Anwar Sadat and the bloody 
conflict in Egypt in the 1990s, the Jama’a Islamiyya’s current political stance of non-
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confrontation with the regime is not unprecedented.  The JI emerged in the 1970s as 
a direct result of the political space opened up by President Anwar Sadat, who 
nurtured Islamist activists on university campuses as a counterweight to the then 
dominant, and hostile, left.  In addition to providing moral and material support, 
Sadat granted students of a religious inclination unprecedented freedom of action.4  
The majority of young Islamists took advantage of this new tolerant attitude on the 
part of the regime to stake out a political space within the system and adopted a 
moderate, gradualist orientation in line with the mainstream of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
 
In 1978, many student activists (such as Isam al-Iryan and Abd al-Mun’im Abu al-
Futuh) merged with the Muslim Brotherhood, breathing fresh life into an 
organisation whose ranks had been depleted during the Nasser years.5  Those who 
did not, including the majority in the universities of the Sa’id (Upper Egypt), 
remained separate under the name ‘Islamic Group’ (Jama’a Islamiyya).  But JI 
violence in the 1970s was not initially directed against the state.  It was aimed at 
leftist students, those behaving in ways deemed to be unIslamic, and Copts.6  The 
young activists based in the Sa’id were vehemently opposed to the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s gradualist and peaceful approach toward social change as a 
prerequisite for an Islamic state.  Many, though not all, JI activists turned to violence 
to enforce correct behaviour.  The fact that Islamists in the south were more 
interested in the use of force (al-taghyeer bi-al-yad) than those of the north has 
been attributed to the sudden introduction of deviant behaviours, as a result of the 
changes wrought by Sadat’s economic liberalisation policy (infitah), into the ‘unitary 
village culture based on religion and heritage, as opposed to the diversity of urban 
culture.’7  Other scholars, as will be discussed below, have also stressed the specific 
Southern context of the JI’s violent agenda.  Also significant in radicalising the group 
was the fact that the JI, in its bid to regain a presence in the north without mending 
fences with the derided Muslim Brotherhood, instead united with the more 
extremist Jihad group led by Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, whose main raisin 
d’être was to plot the overthrow of the regime.8   
 
There were broader underlying reasons, related to the regional political economy, 
for Islamist students in the cities of the north to choose a compact with the regime 
over confrontation at that time.  Infitah, fostered the creation of a more politically 
and economically empowered ‘devout bourgeoisie’ whose chief outlet for political 
expression was the Muslim Brotherhood.  Many had made substantial fortunes in 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states and now played a role in promoting economic 
links between Egypt and the Gulf.  The Brotherhood increasingly came to represent a 
structure for urban social and professional advancement parallel to, and by no 
means always in conflict with, that of the state.9   For those willing and able to 
access Brotherhood structures there was little incentive to threaten this modus 
vivendi through overt confrontation with the regime.   
 
Assassinating Sadat was not a goal from the beginning for the JI and there was 
considerable difference of opinion within the JI on this plan of action.  For those 
ultimately in favour, environmental influences, particularly the Iranian Revolution, 
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certainly created a general atmosphere of possibility for Islamists as a whole.10  But 
what was probably more important was the growing feeling of power, omnipotence 
and concomitant recklessness that young activists in general felt thanks to the 
opportunities that had been afforded them by Sadat, as well as the realistic fear—
sharpened by the security forces’ increasing exasperation with the JI’s violent 
activities in the Sa’id—of being caught up in Sadat’s ill-conceived purge of political 
opposition in September 1981.11  If there was ever going to be a chance to take the 
state and accelerate the process of change, the young Islamist activists felt, it would 
have to be taken sooner rather than later.   
 
Later optimistically recalled as an Islamic revolution (thawra Islamiyya),12 the JI 
intended Sadat’s murder to spark a general uprising in Asyut, during which the 
Islamists would take control of the governorate and, ultimately, the country. The 
group’s focus on da’wa in the 1980s did not relate to any pre-existing belief in the 
desirability of a strategy of peaceful change.  It reflected an acceptance of the dismal 
failure of the Sadat assassination to precipitate revolution, particularly in Upper 
Egypt (the Sa’id).  Da’wa represented a means of raising public consciousness in the 
south such that future revolutionary gambits would be successful.13   Hisba, likewise, 
could be construed as a robust extension of da’wa aimed at accelerating the 
inculcation of Islamic civility according to the JI’s vision, in contrast to the gradual 
and patient approach of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
Several hundred JI militants were released under an amnesty in 1984 and the 
Mubarak regime restored a kind of modus vivendi with the group.  According to this 
understanding, the regime would tolerate the group’s activities on the proviso that 
the latter agreed to conduct itself peacefully and only in the south.14  The JI was 
active throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s in the Sa’id, and later in poor 
suburbs of Cairo like Imbaba, areas where the influence, and to a large degree 
presence, of the state were minimal.  The JI’s activities centred on da’wa and hisba 
but, as relations with official law enforcement deteriorated once again in the 1990s, 
anti-regime violence resumed under the banner of jihad.  
 
Civility in the Jama’a Islamiyya’s writings  
The JI’s early writings reflect a clear-cut theory of political and social change.  The 
Charter of Islamic Action, in circulation from early 1984, employed a metaphor of 
structural engineering to depict the goals and strategies of the Islamic movement.  
The construction of a new Islamic polity would require demolition and a fresh start 
and not simply the improvement or refurbishment of the existing structure.  The 
new polity would have to be built on firm earth, upon solid supports (arkan) and 
with a sound roof, bricks, cement and door.  The foundations of this metaphorical 
building would rest on adherence to God alone (al-i’tisam bi-habl Allah wahdahu), 
which would require the transcendence of selfish or narrower group interests, 
including nation, land, tribe or household and facilitate jihad in the path of God.15 
 
Regardless of the de facto condition of non-confrontation with the regime, Islamising 
the state remained the JI’s central theoretical goal, as it was for the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  But while the Brotherhood made a strategic decision to establish a 
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political presence through contesting elections in the 1980s, the JI maintained a 
principled boycott of all official political activity.  The regime, in its estimation, was 
not Muslim and could not be influenced in a positive way.  Since the rulers did not 
implement shari’a, but governed instead by laws imported from abroad, it was 
incumbent to fight them via jihad.  Confrontation was, as in the title of one of the JI’s 
more famous pamphlets, inevitable.16  The Jihad Organisation theorist Muhammad 
Abd al-Salam Faraj, who was executed for his role in Sadat’s murder, had 
condemned any idea of forming an Islamic political party as it would validate and 
buttress the infidel state.17   And the JI similarly argued that working within the jahili 
system would only strengthen it.  Islam and unbelief could not coexist: ‘there is no 
alternative but to fight to get rid of every sultan that worships another, every ruler 
that stops in the face of the Islamic call, every ruler that refuses to allow Islam to 
flourish…’18   
 
There was not, for the group’s spiritual guide Umar Abd al-Rahman, any difference 
between rulers that abstained from implementing part of the shari’a and those that 
neglected it all: all were unbelievers (kuffar).19  Conceiving all around to be jahiliyya, 
the JI interpreted the struggle for Islam as a tightly structured, logical and ‘deductive’ 
process.20  The entire political sphere would have to be dissolved and reconstituted, 
with the existing hierarchies that supported the apostate ruler circumvented if not 
demolished.  The idea was, in emulation of the first Islamic community in Medina, to 
build a parallel structure of allegiance and political agency, the ‘jama’a’, which would 
embody a new contract of clientage (mawala) among believers.21  In the 1980s, 
though, jihad remained largely a theoretical issue, with da’wa and hisba to prepare 
the ground for the coming revolution forming the backbone of the JI’s political 
programme. 
 
Hisba 
Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil represented for the JI, as it did for the Wahhabis 
of Saudi Arabia with whom the JI had great affinity, a central duty in Islam.  The body 
of jurisprudence (fiqh) on which the JI drew specifies the types of behaviour that are 
correct and those that were unacceptable within the Islamic community, as well as 
the roles of the state and individual Muslims in maintaining moral and legal order.  
Hisba represents, in other words, a blueprint for the creation and preservation of an 
Islamic civility.22   
 
The crucial difference between the prescriptions grouped under the rubric of hisba 
and those under jihad was that the former aimed to preserve and advance the moral 
integrity of the existing Muslim community, whereas the latter regulated the 
community’s behaviour vis-à-vis non-Muslims.  The state of jahiliyya that supposedly 
prevailed in Egypt, as well as the large Coptic presence, however, could easily blur 
the distinction.  Thus although hisba was defined as being aimed at Muslims, the JI 
remained resigned to the fact that the individual implementing hisba, the muhtasib, 
confronted an uphill struggle given the parlous state into which Muslim society has 
descended.  The Charter asserts that the muhtasib should not fear being shunned or 
rejected by seeking to correct aberrant behaviours.  It reminds the potential waverer 
that the duty of hisba remains even if there is little chance that the particular ihtisab 
6 
 
(the act or implementation of hisba) will succeed.23  The jama’a, after all, is 
supposed to provide a new sense of belonging and security.  Thus the charter 
reassures the Islamic activist that: 
  
You must know that you will be a stranger among the people because most 
of the people have lost their way and that those in the right will feel aliened 
from those in the wrong—the alienation of light in the depths of darkness.24 
 
Hisba is a resolutely social and public imperative, aimed at safeguarding the 
collectivity rather than aiding the salvation of the individual Muslim.  It is not 
concerned with private faith or behaviour, but rather targets sins that are open 
(zahir) and thus ‘harm the general public’ (adarrat bi-al-‘ama).25  The munkir (evil or 
wrong) should be obvious, and nobody should engage in spying or surveillance in 
order to expose it.  The charter notes that a munkir is ‘broader than sin’:  if a young 
boy drinks alcohol, for example, he has not committed a sin because he is a minor.  
But if the boy drinks in public, he offends society and has committed a munkir which 
must be rectified.26  The munkir also has to be actually taking place at the time of 
ihtisab since it is not the job of the muhtasib to implement the hudud or ta’zeer 
(punishments).  Were there to be a muhtasib designated by a Muslim Imam such on-
the-spot punishment may be acceptable.27   
 
Once a munkir has been identified, hisba triggers a series of escalating responses, 
beginning with informing the culprit that his or her behaviour is wrong (ta’rif), 
passing through advising, admonition, force (taghyeer bi-al-yad) and ending with 
physically attacking that person.  Before violence can be used, the perpetrator (al-
muhtasab ‘alayhi) must first be given the chance to rectify matters, by, for example 
pouring away his own alcohol.  If beatings should become necessary to stop the 
munkir, care must be taken that a wider confrontation is not provoked wherein the 
muhtasib and the muhtasab alayhi draw weapons or gather accomplices against 
each other.  The Charter notes that the duty of hisba should not be discharged if it 
will give rise to a greater munkir, especially causing discord (fitna).28   
 
Certain restrictions are laid out in the Charter concerning what practices should 
activate the steps associated with hisba, or what may be treated as a munkir 
justifying corrective action.  In this area, the JI’s ambiguous approach to the broader 
Egyptian society appears problematic.  Since historically hisba was elaborated to 
rectify aberrant behaviours, and the JI considered much of Egyptian society to have 
lapsed into jahiliyya, the conservative aspect of hisba fell down and it became a 
doctrine for cultural revolution.  The Charter notes the jurisprudential principle that 
only munkirs intersubjectively accepted as such (such as behaviour around prayer, 
fasting, adultery or alcohol) obligate hisba.29  More obscure behaviours, or activities 
on the legality of which there is disagreement among ulema, should not initiate an 
ihtisab on the part of private individuals.  But it is left open in the Charter which 
community, given jahiliyya, needs to have reached a consensus on correct versus 
unacceptable behaviour.  The clear implication is that the Jama’a, as the new society 
in waiting, constitutes the legitimate arbiter of right and wrong. 
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Although it has been suggested that the JI only recently accepted an interpretation 
of hisba as a fard kifaya (collective duty),30 the JI has actually remained consistent on 
this point.  Like ‘offensive’ jihad, for the group, not every member of the community 
was obliged to undertake hisba.  But the Charter quotes Ibn Taymiyya to the effect 
that it becomes an individual obligation (fard ayn) on every able person if nobody 
else is doing it.31  Hisba, the Charter notes, ideally occurs in the framework of rule by 
a Muslim imam who can appoint a suitably qualified person as muhtasib.  However,  
 
In our time when our rulers have apostasised by replacing the shari’a they 
have no moral mandate and the duty for everyone is to rebel against and 
remove them.  How could anyone say they should be obliged, or even 
permitted, to carry out hisba?32   
 
In the absence of an Imam, then, the responsibility must be carried out by others, 
and those working in the service of Islam (‘al-‘amilun li-hadha al-din’), by implication 
the members of the JI, should constitute the ‘tali’a’, or vanguard, of hisba.33 
 
The Charter deals with the anticipated objection that in the absence of a Muslim 
imam the duty of hisba, like jihad, falls into abeyance.  This spurious conditionality, it 
insists, is without basis in fiqh.  Some of the salaf themselves even used hisba against 
the imams if the latter acted in contravention of the shari’a.  In support, the Charter 
cites the famous hadith that ‘the greatest jihad is a word of truth to a tyrannical 
ruler’, pointing out that it would be ridiculous, in light of this, to have to ask that 
ruler’s permission to speak out against him.34  The Quranic verse (Al ‘Imran: 104) is 
interpreted to mean that the umma is charged with hisba, even in the absence of an 
Imam.1  As we will see, the JI reinterpret this verse later to mean that only certain 
people must carry out the function.   
 
The JI leaders’ were certainly not against a strong state role in maintaining an Islamic 
civility.  The Charter authors admit that in the best of cases hisba should take place 
under the aegis of a state authority (sulta):   
 
An effective ruler [sulta dhat sultan] is more able than an ineffective one to 
enjoin the good and forbid evil, but this does not mean carrying out hisba 
falls into abeyance when that authority is absent, as is the case now.  If 
enjoining good and forbidding evil is required when an imam exists, then 
surely the duty is even more pressing in his absence.35   
 
The JI thus rejected the philosophy of other groups, like the Jihad Organisation, that 
hisba, and da’wa, should be set aside until the infidel regime is overthrown and a 
legitimate imam installed in power.  Giving up hisba, as an Islamic injunction, would 
just be one more victory for jahiliyya.  It should not be ignored in favour of 
correcting the greater munkir, rule by jahiliyya.  Jihad, hisba and da’wa must all take 
place simultaneously.36 
                                                         
1 The verse reads ‘Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining 
what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity’ (Yusuf Ali translation.) 
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Hisba and Jihad in Context 
It must be emphasised that there was no simple association between the JI’s 
ideological or theoretical statements and its activities on the ground.  For one thing 
the historic leadership that authored the texts remained behind bars, whereas the 
so-called ‘second tier’ leaders, rank and file and those fighting jihad in Afghanistan, 
were caught up in different contexts that had their own dynamics.  But the way in 
which the Charter tackles the question of hisba did reflect the JI’s uncertain position 
vis-à-vis society.  The JI saw itself in the process of establishing an exclusive jama’a 
that would restructure the social terrain of Egypt and inculcate a new Islamic civility, 
but at the same time its leaders wanted to build a mass movement and hence could 
not alienate society as a whole, as did more marginal obscurantist groups like the 
Society of Muslims (also known as al-takfir wa-al-hijra). Although accepting Sayyid 
Qutb’s designation of state and society as jahiliyya, in seeking to build a large 
grassroots following the JI could not, like those groups, pronounce takfir (accuse of 
unbelief) on all Egyptian Muslims aside from the narrow jama’a of committed 
jihadists.37  The JI thus made strategic use of the Islamic concept of al-‘adhr bi al-
jahl, or ‘excusing ignorance.’38  Under this rubric, being in a state of jahiliyya was no 
barrier to membership in the group since Egyptians could not be blamed for failing 
to follow the right path in the face of the longstanding and multifarious conspiracies 
against Islam in the country. 
 
Similarly the ‘egalitarian’ components of the Charter and other writings—those 
calling for the establishment of the ‘jama’a’, transcending family and tribal 
loyalties—resonated with the practical contexts that JI activists confronted.  In the 
new quarters of Cairo, for example, tribal or familial systems of arbitration, conflict 
resolution and symbolic solace broke down and the JI mobilised in an atmosphere of 
criminality as a substitute for both traditional and modern (i.e. state) patterns of 
civility.39 In rural areas in southern Egypt, the JI emerged not in a socio-political 
vacuum or alongside criminal gangs, but in a tribal society in transition.  It was also 
the relative absence of both the Muslim Brotherhood as a parallel structure of 
belonging and the official ulema, as ‘organic intellectuals’ of the state in the south 
and popular urban quarters, that led many people to join the Jama’a Islamiyya.40   
 
The egalitarianism of the Charter also perhaps reflected the frustration of some 
elements of the rural middle class with the socioeconomic transformations of the 
1970s.  One of the ways in which Sadat undermined Nasser’s support base in that 
decade was by reversing some of the latter’s agrarian and political reforms to 
increase the standing of the rural aristocracy in national political and economic life.41  
This disadvantaged the lower-status peasants that had benefited from Nasserism, 
many of whom left Egypt to work in the Gulf.42  The regime could be blamed for the 
persistence of a blocked and often repressive rural social system, bolstered by 
Sufism, into which the returning nouveau riche could or would not integrate.  Islamic 
activists in urban centres instead sought political expression among the similarly 
‘discontented former rural working class.’43  
 
The discursive traditions of Islam offered a resource for both legitimising and 
opposing the status quo.  As Fandy has observed, in at least some parts of Southern 
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Egypt, rural elites rationalised their superiority with reference to Qur’anic precepts, 
such as: ‘We raised some of you above the others by different degrees.’44  The 
dominant groups within Sa’idi society also unsurprisingly tended to emphasise the 
importance of local tradition and customs, often relying on illustrious descent in 
order to affirm their Islamic piety.  Bereft of such hereditary attributes, the religious 
respectability of lower status peasants could be enhanced through regular 
attendance or perhaps preaching at new mosques, often built by newly rich peasants 
returning from work in the Gulf and infused with egalitarian religiosity:  
 
The educated sons of the newly rich preached in these mosques, emphasizing 
very different Islamic messages from those of their tribal predecessors.  The 
message from these new mosques undermined the traditional tribal 
hierarchy: Islam says that there is no difference between those who are from 
Arab origin and those who are not.  What is important in Islam is piety.45 
 
The JI’s growing popularity alarmed the erstwhile quiescent regime, as did the 
challenge to the authority of the state presented by the group’s persistence with 
hisba.  Quiescence turned into repression. This in turn provoked violence as ‘the 
accumulative effects of constant government arrest, torture, and humiliation in the 
Sa’id… pushed pious activists across the thin line that heretofore had separated 
them from those committed to mayhem.’46  This was expressed ideologically as the 
activation of the third element in the JI programme, jihad.  Reciprocal violence found 
clear theoretical support in the JI’s tracts, in particular in the staged and 
proportionate approach to building the new Islamic society it prescribed.  The 
Charter notes, for example, that the enemies of Islam will use a variety of techniques 
against it, including media, education and force.47  Elsewhere, the JI exhort followers 
to fight power with power, to confront violence with violence.48  State violence, as 
such, would be met with jihad. 
 
Both hisba and jihad received some, not wholehearted, approval in society.  In 
addition to providing security and protection to dislocated peasants, the JI engaged 
in a number of well-received welfare activities, such as selling books and Islamic 
dress at cut prices and providing medical assistance to the poor via doctors that 
were members of the JI, as well as holding seminars and preaching.  All this went a 
long way toward lessening the negative effects of the violence.49  Al-Awa also 
suggests that people were broadly sympathetic to the JI’s ideological message and 
that the group was well connected with its society, that it ‘coexisted’ (muta’ayish) 
and that despite the fact that many people became victims of JI violence, as acts of 
resistance against a state toward which few harboured affection, they were 
tolerated.50  But they did not effect sufficient dislocation—or generate sufficient 
support—to propel Egypt into a general civil or revolutionary war. 
 
It may be argued that part of what was distinctive about the JI jihad was not the 
violence per se, but the use of violence unregulated by existing social norms, and the 
promotion, with or without violence, of new practices and structures—supported by 
new ideas—as alternatives to the traditional hierarchies and their legitimating Sufi 
ideology on which the Sadat regime at least in part depended to rule.  This jihad 
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failed not only because of the vastly superior levels of force arrayed against it, or 
because of the Egyptian public’s disgust at the escalating brutality, but because the 
attempt to build the jama’a, to inculcate new structures of meaning, organisation 
and clientage, also failed.  Egypt’s uneven development process may ultimately hold 
the key.  Beneath the surface modernisation contained in infitah and structural 
adjustment, the social structure underpinning the political system tenaciously 
remained.   
 
Traditional religious and tribal norms certainly persisted in the Sa’id, with the 
distinction between the two often blurred.  As Neilsen suggests, ‘to many people of 
Upper Egypt, tribalism and Islam ... refer to the same cultural register.’51  Despite the 
ink spilled elaborating the technicalities of hisba, and the exuberant execution of this 
imperative by young Islamists, the JI was ultimately not able to decisively erode 
customary beliefs and practices.  Saudi-style salafism did not consistently impact 
traditional customs and beliefs in the countryside even as JI da’wa activities and 
labour migration increased.  Instead, 
 
Ironically, while the Saudi regime tries to promote some form of the Wahhabi 
creed, what many also gain from time spent in the Arabian Peninsula is an 
experience that underscores the importance of tribal or quasi-tribal 
affiliations.52 
 
Although some Sa’idis may have returned from the Gulf, established mosques and 
promoted a new, more egalitarian, Islam to subvert tradition, others spent 
‘significant time and effort in defining (or redefining) themselves within the existing 
tribal system.’53  The complex of influences including education and labour migration 
could just as much reinforce hierarchies as prompt insurrection against them.  Often, 
as Rashwan has reported, the tribal structure remained a bulwark of stability: 
‘Despite the death of numerous clan members during the phase of extremist 
violence from 1992-1997, clans never used their allegiances to start a vendetta 
against the state or its security services. ... traditional clans remained, largely, above 
the extremist foray [sic].’54  
 
Others have similarly identified the mutually reinforcing symbolic and structural role 
of Sufi orders in militating against the JI’s intellectual and organisational success in 
the Egyptian countryside, where it was strongest: 
 
Given [the] isomorphism between the village social structure and the orders 
it is not surprising that the various ‘fundamentalist’ movements in Egypt had 
barely penetrated into villages ... which are organized hierarchically.  These 
movements tend to have strong egalitarian tendencies, and at some level are 
a challenge by youth to elders.55 
 
The new revised Jama’a Islamiyya 
By the mid-1990s, not only were the Egyptian security forces exacting a massive toll 
on JI operatives and enclaves in Upper Egypt and Cairo, but excessive and apparently 
indiscriminate violence was also apparently turning public opinion against the JI.  It 
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was also being openly condemned by key Islamist forces regionally.56  Both local and 
regional condemnation increased markedly after the 1997 Luxor massacre, which 
was carried out by a renegade faction after the permanent ceasefire declared in the 
same year.  In 2002, the leadership announced its ‘ideological revisions’, touring 
prisons to lecture the membership on the new course.  Not only was the regime no 
longer to be considered kafir, but the assassinated president Sadat was described as 
a martyr.57   
 
Since then, the JI has positioned itself as a legitimate patriotic actor seeking to 
promote the cause of Islam in society.  Although banned under Mubarak from 
reviving its traditional interfaces with the people, particularly the mosque pulpit, the 
JI continues to promote a distinct worldview through its writings and very active 
website and aspires to establish a legally sanctioned NGO or association (jam’iyah).2  
Its general orientation has remained one of moralistic conservatism with a focus on 
identifying and rectifying moral problems in Egyptian society such as rising crime and 
baltaja (thuggery), drug and alcohol use, corruption, as well as—in common with the 
Islamist phenomenon as a whole—secular ‘extremism’ and communism while, 
perhaps most consistently, lambasting the excesses of al-Qa’ida and its affiliates.  
The JI also consistently called on the Mubarak regime to adopt a hard line against 
criminality and those it saw as fomenting fitna, including sectarian strife, within 
Egyptian society.3 
 
The JI’s evolution marks the group’s acceptance of a prevailing elite consensus in 
Egypt that insists upon the distinct but complimentary roles of state and society in 
the broader national project and, in particular, the maintenance of Egyptian national 
unity against external threats.58  The transition involved shifts in attitudes toward 
state and society.  Although the destruction of the group’s infrastructure by the state 
was important in halting the violence, as important was the JI’s failure to build its 
jama’a, which is in turn explicable in terms of the resilience of the rural social system 
and its Sufi ideological counterpart.  On the international level, also, the events of 
9/11 and the destruction visited upon Afghanistan had as sobering an effect on the JI 
as that of the Iranian revolution of 1979 was invigorating.  In particular the Taliban’s 
fate seemed to highlight the folly of a salafist jama’a trying to bridge the gap 
between social and cultural reform, on the one hand, and governing a modern state, 
on the other.59  
 
Following the ceasefire and revisions process the most significant shift in the JI’s 
thinking toward the state was to retract the accusation that the regime or ruler was 
kafir.  Whereas the JI had previously insisted that a ruler that omitted to implement 
any part of the shari’a was as bad as one that ignored all of it, following the revisions                                                         
2 Following the ousting of Husni Mubarak on 11 February 2011 the historic leaders of the JI, including 
key spokesman and ideologue Najih Ibrahim and leader Karam Zuhdi began holding public meetings 
and addressing mosque congregations—including in the Sa’id—for the first time in three decades.  
The group maintains its commitment to peaceful political action and the formation of a jam’iyah, and 
does not rule out forming a political party. 
3 See the group’s website, www.egyig.com, for copious articles and statements reflecting these 
stances. 
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process the leadership insisted that neglecting the duties of religion was sin (‘asyan) 
and not unbelief (kufr).  The neglect of duties does not make one an unbeliever, but 
merely ‘a believer with incomplete faith’ (mu’min naqis al-iman).60 
 
In a substantial new intervention, the JI has sought to intellectually reclaim, or 
redefine, the notion of hakimiyya, sovereignty (of God), first elaborated by the 
Indian thinker Abu al-Ala’ al-Mawdudi, further developed by Sayyid Qutb, and then 
acted upon by jihadists from the 1970s.  Hakimiyya, according to the new stance, has 
been misused as a way for Muslims to declare unbelief (takfir) on every Muslim 
leader regardless of their strengths and weaknesses on the grounds that they are not 
ruling absolutely by the shari’a.  In reality hakimiyya should be understood to mean 
that the ultimate reference in governance should be God and the Prophet, but not 
that ‘every rule or earthly order must be found in these sources.’  While the ruler 
should not govern in a way that clashes with the shari’a, the Qur’an and Sunna do 
not address every single issue that a leader must confront.61 
 
The new thought shifts the focus of hakimiyya away from rulers.  Revealing a 
conception of governance more patriarchal than egalitarian, it insists that hakimiyya 
applies to everyone throughout the social hierarchy: to the man in his house, the 
manager in his company and the military commander in his unit.  Hakimiyya obliges 
all people to act in accordance with the shari’a, which emphasises equality before 
the law.  As such, Muslims should be no stricter on state rulers just because they are 
rulers: everybody makes mistakes, or commits sins, but this does not place them in 
the category of unbelief.62  But the JI’s promotion of equality now is not, as it was in 
the past, to bring the oppressed up to the level of the elites, but rather to protect 
those elites from undue criticism and rebellion.   
 
This patriarchal sensibility also colours the new thinking on hisba.  As part of the first 
tranche of writings laying out the revisions, the JI published a short tract entitled 
Advice and clarification in rectifying the understandings of those exercising hisba.  
The ‘old’ hisba, as Meijer has rightly noted, at times ‘represented a multi-faceted 
repertoire of contention that was also used to encroach upon the prerogatives of the 
authorities.’63  In the past, the JI now regret, some viewed hisba as a form of 
rebellion against the state, an aggression against its authority and a way of rejecting 
its right to regulate society.64  The new hisba confirms the authority of the regime 
and the sanctity of patriarchal governance. 
 
Whereas the Charter called for displacing conflicting loyalties, such as those toward 
household, tribe and village, the more recent book on hisba devotes an entire 
chapter to honouring and respecting one’s parents.  It quotes a hadith to the effect 
that honouring one’s parents is a second loyalty in Islam, after prayer and before 
jihad.  The good Muslim should never be violent, insulting or threatening toward 
parents nor do anything, including hisba, which might harm them even indirectly.  
This excludes almost any culturally innovative or new behaviour and departs from 
the previous admonition to carry out hisba even if it will not work or makes the 
muhtasib the target of criticism.  This advice is aimed at limiting potentially divisive 
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or controversial interventions since over-exuberant hisba could bring shame or 
embarrassment to ones parents.65 
 
The book covers much of the same ground as did the Charter on hisba, and much of 
the advice offered is the same: it is improper to spy (tajassus) or seek out 
transgression; the munkir must be open (zahir); threats of force must be 
proportionate, credible and consonant with shari’a; and the act of ihtisab must not 
result in a greater munkir, through spreading dissonance or fitna in society.  But the 
Qur’anic verse (Al ‘Imran: 104) is reinterpretated not as evidence that the umma 
must engage in hisba regardless of the absence of an Imam, but that the notion of 
fard kifaya does not just mean that individuals need not engage in hisba, but that 
they should not if others are already doing so.66   
 
The sequence of escalating steps is the same, but the new treatment of hisba delves 
in more detail into the question of who can be the muhtasib, and here the key 
differentiator is that the ruler, being no longer considered an infidel, can appoint 
official muhtasibun.  There thus exist two categories of muhtasib: the appointed (al-
muhtasib al-mu’ayyan) and the volunteer (al-muhtasin al-mutatawi’).  In all cases it 
is the appointed muhtasib who must take responsibility for executing the steps 
involving the use or threat of force.  If the appointed muhtasib is present or can 
easily be summoned, private citizens can only assist on the request of the state-
appointed official.   
 
The muhtasib al-mutatawi’ can only take the initiative if the designated muhtasib is 
completely unavailable.  At this point, the volunteer’s role is limited to intervening in 
crimes against society generally recognised as such, such as rape or pickpocketing.67  
The text continues that if thwarting the crime would clash with the values or 
customs of society or break the law, or if the mufsida (detriment) is greater than the 
munkir, then the individual should not intervene.  That such customs and mores vary 
from one society to another, the book notes, complicates the practice of hisba.   
 
All in all, though, it is best to leave things to the recognised authorities, which in 
modern Egypt means the police.  For the new JI, hisba has become a mandate for a 
form of civic responsibility leading up to citizen’s arrest that would not be unusual in 
most Western countries.  The JI has not become pacifist and allows that citizens may 
sometimes legitimately use force, again in line with the legal environment in 
Western democracies.  Violence is appropriate, for example, to prevent a rape or 
murder from taking place, or to thwart a thief.  And the JI is a strong supporter of 
state violence, including the death penalty, as a means of reducing rampant 
criminality.68  It is also clear that the JI is most impressed with the system in Saudi 
Arabia where hisba is organised and administered via a ministry of state.  The group 
has long been influenced by Wahhabism, but previously was rather more attracted 
to the concept of al-wala’ wa-al-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal)69 than it was to that of 
wali al-amr, which underpins the authority of the Al Sa’ud, and which the JI now 
seems keen to replicate in Egypt.   
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The approach to hisba promoted by the new Jama’a Islamiyya essentially represents 
a vote of confidence in the self-regulatory potential of Egyptian patriarchal society 
and authoritarian governance as well as an appeal to the positive role of official law 
enforcement that many Egyptians would find excessively optimistic and which, 
perhaps wilfully, ignores the fact that the Egyptian state exercises a very limited 
degree of control over behaviour in many rural and urban areas, and where it does 
have a presence is regarded as capricious and corrupt.  Roel Meijer has recently 
celebrated the fact that the JI has: 
 
[p]rovided the groundwork for a much more mature Islamic political theory 
that focuses on human agency and opens the way for an Islamic civil society 
based on an Islamic concept of civility and civic virtue that has left behind the 
rigorism and dogmatism of Salafism.70 
 
Meijer also notes that ‘hisba has become the cornerstone of a new Muslim civil 
society that is based on the obligations and rights of the citizen in a new contractual 
relationship with the state.’71  This may, however, be wishful thinking.  In an 
important sense the JI remains as ‘deductive’ as ever it was.  The only difference is 
that whereas before the group proceeded from an ideal salafi vision of the world, 
now it proceeds from an idealised view of existing state-society relations in Egypt.  
The interpretation of hisba that now seems modern and progressive assumes the 
presence of an official police system that is respected and considered just by the 
citizenry.  This most certainly does not exist in Egypt, and the revised version of hisba 
is thus no less fanciful than the old one. 
 
More detail on the JI’s new self conception, and vision for maintaining civility in 
Egypt, can be gleaned from material on its website.   A statement released in 
September 2010 calls on the Islamic movement to work toward coexistence and 
cooperation with the state to do good, protect the country and preserve the Islamic 
civilisational identity of the umma.  The JI, the statement continues, wants to 
transform itself into a ‘type of permanent relationship between the Islamic 
movement and the state,’ and sees its revisions process as ‘reopening the file on 
state-society relations’.   By empowering the Islamic movement (which will only 
happen if the state believes the ceasefire to be sincere) the state will benefit from 
the positive energy of the Muslim youth in developing society and ‘nourishing its 
morals’.  But the Islamic movement cannot arrogate to itself rights given to 
governments, like hudud punishments or declaring wars: these are all issues for 
governments, not citizens.  Islamists should also not pursue a futile quest for power, 
which international and regional forces would compel them to relinquish even if 
they were successful.72   
 
The JI in the Egyptian context 
Many Egypt observers see the nebulous but pervasive salafi trend to be more 
powerful (ideologically and perhaps economically) than the Muslim Brotherhood.73  
The source of much of the salafis’ appeal, and ideological power, is arguably their 
principled opposition to and detachment from the state and what they see as 
secular politics.  The country’s salafi preachers and their followers seem, along with 
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the leadership of the JI, to have accepted that state power is not worth fighting for.  
Neoliberalism, in addition to Egypt’s perceived subservience to foreign powers and 
relative freedom of expression for (the right kind of) Islamists has rendered such a 
struggle obsolete. 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood, under the influence of the ‘1970s generation’, has moved 
steadily toward becoming a mainstream parliamentary force, even to the point of 
forming a political party.  It has built bridges with secular forces in society, including 
the left.  Many of its younger generation of bloggers are outspoken advocates of 
democracy and senior figures like Isam al-Iryan, Abd al-Mun’im Abu al-Futuh and 
Khayrat Shatir offer pragmatic, realist policy directions.  The political goal of 
establishing an Islamic state is notable only by its absence in most contemporary 
Brotherhood discourse. Nominally independent thinkers known as the ‘new 
Islamists’ and the wasatiyya or Middle Way pursued a similar course.  Intellectuals 
like Fahmi Huwaydi, the late Muhammad al-Ghazali, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi have 
developed a pragmatic and conciliatory stance—gently challenging and engaging 
with the regime on policies rather than impugning its Islamic credentials.74   
 
It is the Muslim Brotherhood’s continued engagement with the state, and perceived 
quest for political power, that has alienated many erstwhile and would-be 
supporters. Those lost followers see their interests better represented by the 
apolitical salafi trend, which many see as representing more of Egypt than the 
Brotherhood.75  The trend is manifested in satellite TV channels as well as individual 
educators and preachers. It appeals to those parts of society not included in the 
Brotherhood’s own patronage networks—particularly the vast urban poor.  Its very 
aloofness from contestatory politics has led the regime to tolerate and encourage it 
as a counterweight to the Brotherhood.  The JI is currently in limbo, but seems to be 
staking out a halfway house between the quiescent and disparate salafi ‘trend’ and 
the opportunistic Brotherhood.  It offers a more coherent salafi agenda with the 
benefits of belonging and meaning that accrue to membership of a group.   
 
The JI was quick to condemn the car bombing at the Two Saints Church in Alexandria 
on New Year’s Day, 2011.  In a press statement it echoed Mubarak’s insinuation that 
a ‘foreign hand’ lay behind the attack and called on Christians and Muslims to work 
together to avoid fitna.  A subsequent article by one of the site’s editors, Islam al-
Ghamri, reveals much about the JI’s political strategy, which is to lobby for an ever 
greater role as a source of moral guidance on which the regime can depend.  Ghamri 
exhorts his readers:  
 
Make room for moderate scholars and thinkers of all persuasions, in 
particular those of the Jama’a Islamiyya because of the wisdom they have 
gained through their trials and tribulations.  The JI will be able, with God’s 
permission, to raise awareness among the youth (taw’iyat al-shabab).  
Prevention of disease is always better than cure.76 
 
The extent to which whatever administration succeeds the Mubarak regime will 
allow such renewed activism to occur remains an open question, but the JI was 
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becoming more strident in its advocacy even before the new opportunities opened 
up by Mubarak’s sudden fall from power.  The website underwent a major 
renovation in March 2010 and updates every day with new materials.  JI spokesmen, 
particularly Nageh Ibrahim, have been frequent contributors in the Egyptian press 
for several years.  Articles on the website include profiles and interviews with Islamic 
activists of various stripes, religious advice, documents related to the ceasefire and 
revisions process (al-mubadira), and news items reproduced from elsewhere.  The 
site also features a regular ‘bulletin on the state of Egyptian society [nashrat ahwal 
al-mujtama’a al-misri]’.  The bulletin often adopts a populist ‘bring back hanging’ 
tone that bemoans the rising criminality and corruption, and the overly lenient penal 
system in Egypt.  Each bulletin covers a variety of topics and begins with a preamble 
outlining its rationale: the Islamic movement needs to shift its focus away from 
foreign affairs and toward internal social issues; the Islamic movement’s primary job 
is to ‘reform society and treat its ills’ and this requires a detailed understanding of 
society in all of its negative as well as positive aspects. 
 
Conclusion 
The story of the Jama’a Islamiyya tells us much about the resilience, penetration and 
hybridity of authoritarianism in Egypt.  The JI has embodied two distinct approaches 
to generating civility in the country.  The first, an egalitarian vision based on a salafi 
interpretation of Islam and a rejection of the legitimacy of the regime, fell down 
because it failed to make sufficient inroads into the hierarchical structures on which 
that regime was based.  The second, ‘modern’ version more akin to Western 
conceptions of civic responsibility in which civil society, and law enforcement, act to 
reinforce the overall cultural basis of the state in ways that are broadly accepted as 
legitimate, also seems likely to falter due to its dependence on an unrealistic 
conception of the Egyptian state as an upholder of civic virtue and the law.  
 
The JI seeks to reinvent itself as the key interface between state and society and the 
bearer of responsibility for moral guidance.  But although the group continues to 
foreswear both intra-societal and anti-regime violence, its consistent advocacy for 
the judicious deployment of the state’s hard power against society’s ills, and 
apparent willingness to accept—or even help to disguise—the inefficacy and 
corruption of state law enforcement, means that any evolving partnership between 
the JI and a regime like that of Mubarak is likely to remain ‘uncivil.’ 
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